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NOTES AND COMMENTS
AGENCY
RIGHT OF AN ASSISTANT TO RECOVER DAMAGES FOR THE NEG-
LIGENCE OF THE SERVANT
The Cloverdale Dairy Co. forbid their employees to hire assistants,
or to permit outsiders to ride upon their trucks, upon which they had
painted "no riders" signs. One of their drivers, without their knowl-
edge, employed one Briggs, a minor, to assist him in deliveries. The
evidence showed that Briggs always got on the truck away from the
company's premises, and always left when the company made its route
inspection. Briggs was injured through the negligence of the driver,
and he brought a tort action against the Dairy Co. in the Common
Pleas Court of Belmont County. The trial court excluded evidence
tending to show plaintiff had knowledge of the defendant's rules. Judg-
ment was rendered for the plaintiff. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the judgment. The Supreme Court held the exclusion of evidence
reversible error, in that the trial court's ruling did not allow defendant
opportunity to show whether plaintiff was the servant of the company
or of the driver. This, it held, should have been submitted to the jury,
and the case was reversed and remanded. The Cloverdale Dairy Co. v.
Briggs, Infant, 131 Ohio St. 261, 2 N.E. (2d) 592, Ohio Bar, June
8, 1936 (1936).
According to agency theory, an assistant can hold the master liable
when the servant had authority, express or implied in fact, to seek aid in
his work. Cooper v. Lowery, 4 Ga. App. I2o, 6o S.E. 1015 (19o8) ;
Bayne v. Billings, 3o R.I. 53, 73 Atl. 625 (I909); White v. Levi &
Co., 137 Ga. 269, 73 S.E. 376 (1911); Potter v. Golden Rule Gro-
cery Co., 169 Tenn. 240, 84 S.W. (2d) 364 (i935).
Such authority may be implied when an emergency arises that makes
it necessary in the employer's interest that his employee have temporary
assistance. Pennsylvania Co. v. Gallagher, 40 Ohio St. 637, 48 Am.
Rep. 689 (1884); Hollidge v. Duncan, i99 Mass. 121, 85 N.E. 186,
17 L.R.A. (N.S.) 982 (19o8); Sloan v. Central Iowa R. Co., 62
Iowa 728, i6 N.W. 331 (1883); L. & N. R. Co. v. Ginley, ioo
Tenn. 472, 45 S.W. 348 (1897); Mechem, Agency, Sec. 306. Where
the work is arduous but is purely manual and requires no skill or dis-
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cretion, the power to appoint a subservant may be implied. Lezn v. City
of Omaha, 102 Nebr. 328, 167 N.W. 214 (918); Williams v.
Wood, 16 Md. 22o (i86o); Eldridge v. Holway, I8 Ill. 446 (r857).
In the Brigg's case, the employment of the servant did not carry
with it any express authority to hire an assistant and the evidence would
seem to reveal none of the elements necessary to imply an authority.
In such instances, it has been held that the servant is but the servant
of the servant and not of the master; and some courts have said that
the assistant cannot recover from the master for any injury resulting
from the unauthorized hiring by the servant. James v. Muelhlebach,
34 Mo. App. 512, (1889); Looney v. Bingham Dairy Co., 75 Utah,
53, 282 Pac. 1030, 73 A.L.R. 427 (1929); Raible v. Hygienic Ice &
Refrigerating Co., i19 N.Y.S. 138, 134 App. Div. 705 (1909);
Driscoll v. Scanlon, 165 Mass. 348, 43 N.E. IOO (1896).
The only other agency theory which might plausibly be advanced
on the plaintiff's behalf is that of estoppel. If the defendant placed his
servant in such a position that he had the apparent authority to hire an
assistant, and if the plaintiff, dealing with the servant, reasonably relied
upon this apparent authority, the employer might justly be estopped from
denying his liability. In the principal case, however, the plaintiff cannot
avail himself of this theory, as it appears from the admitted evidence
that the assistant actually knew there was no authority to appoint a
sub-servant.
Discarding the agency theory for the moment, one might regard
the plaintiff as a mere third person. If the plaintiff had been the guest
of the servant, who was driving the master's car in the course of busi-
ness, and who had no authority to extend such invitation, the master
would not be liable to the guest even if the servant were wantonly and
wilfully negligent. Union Gas & Electric Co. v. Crouch, 123 Ohio
St. 8I, 174 N.E. 6, 33 Ohio L. Rep. 441, 74 A.L.R. 16o (1930).
If it could be said that the plaintiff assisted with the work, deriving
no benefit to himself, that is, was a mere volunteer, the courts have held
the assistant stands sufficiently in the relation of a servant to preclude
recovery from the master under the fellow-servant doctrine. Mayton v.
Railroad, 63 Tex. 77, 51 Am. Rep. 637 (1885); New Orleans R. R.
Co. v. Harrison, 48 Miss. 112, 12 Am. Rep. 356 (1873); Osborne v.
Knox & Lincoln R. R., 68 Me. 49, 28 Am. Rep. I6 (1877) ; Flower
v. Penn. R. R. Co., 69 Pa. St. 210, 8 Am. Rep. 25I (1871).
Ohio courts, however, hold a mere volunteer not a servant of the
master, but consider him in the same position as a trespasser, and as
such, he can recover from the master only for injury wilfully and
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wantonly inflicted by the servant. General R. Signal Co. v. Valois, 25
Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 423, 35 Ohio C.D. 302 (19o9); Lake Shore &
M. S. R. Co. v. Duer, 21 Ohio C.C. 512, II Ohio C.D. 761 (19oi);
Cleveland Terminal & Valley R. R. Co. v. Marsh, 63 Ohio St. 236,
58 N.E. 821, 52 L.R.A. 142, 9 Am. Neg. Rep. 167, 44 Bull. 343
(190oo); Ohm v. Miller, 31 Ohio App. 446, 167 N.E. 482 (1928).
But where the assistant, at the request of a servant having no author-
ity to seek such aid, serves some purpose of his own, as well as assisting
in the work of the master, he is not a mere volunteer, but neither is he
a servant of the master. He is considered on the premises by sufferance
of the master and as such is entitled to be protected against the neg-
ligence of the owner of the premises or his servants. Cleveland Terminal
& Valley R. R. Co. v. Marsh, supra; McIntyre Street Railway Co. v.
Bolton, 43 Ohio St. 224, I N.E. 335, 54 Am. Rep. 803 (1885);
Delivery Co. v. Callachan, 9 Ohio App. 65, 31 Ohio C.A. 345
(1917); General R. Signal Co. v. Valois, supra.
The facts in the principal case might conceivably be brought under
this latter doctrine, as the plaintiff served both his own purpose and that
of the master. Following the Marsh case, supra, the assistant could thus
recover, not on the basis that he was a servant, but on the ground that
he was a third person to whom the master was liable for the negligence
of his servants.
As to the ruling on the exclusion of evidence, if the trial court's
decision was based on the authority implied in fact of the driver to
appoint an assistant, the court was correct in excluding evidence that
Briggs had knowledge of the rules of the company, as this would be
irrelevant; and the Supreme Court erred in its reversal of the decision.
In view of that evidence which was admitted this theory would seem un-
tenable, however, as against the weight of evidence. If recovery was
allowed on the basis of apparent authority to hire an assistant, which
authority was relied on, so as to create an estoppel, the Supreme Court
was correct in holding the exclusion of the evidence to be reversible
error as this evidence would have helped disprove the essential element
of reliance. Finally, if judgment was rendered for the plaintiff on the
ground that he was a third person, the decision of the trial court should
have been sustained.
Unfortunately, the opinion of the Supreme Court cites no authority
and gives no indication of which view was adopted. Since the reversal
can only be supported on the theory of estoppel, this would seem the most
plausible explanation of its ruling. HELEN BLANK.
